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We analyse state-owned enterprise (SOE) behaviour under pure and 
mixed oligopoly. An industry comprising at least two SOEs is shown not to 
have a symmetric stable equilibrium. This suggests the need for planning in 
such industries. For mixed oligopoly, we assume that an SOE has a cost 
disadvantage. When fixed costs must be sunk before entry, free entry implies 
that, if the SOE cost disadvantage is not too large, the presence of an SOE is 
immaterial for welfare (there is no welfare gain from privatisation). Similarly, 
a free-entry all-private oligopoly is welfare-superior to a public monopoly 
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1. Introduction 
Although a large and growing literature exists on mixed oligopoly,1 the 
interplay of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) among themselves and with 
private firms that maximise profit still throws up some interesting and as yet 
unresolved problems. Using a very simple formulation, we identify new 
results on the existence of stable equilibria, on the irrelevance of differences 
between firms’ objective functions, and on the scale of the efficiency gains that 
make an all-private oligopoly preferable to a public monopoly. We assume 
that SOEs maximise an increasing function of their own output, subject to a 
break-even constraint (see Crémer, Marchand and Thisse (1989) and Estrin 
and de Meza (1995) for similar models). This approach contrasts with the 
earlier modelling surveyed by De Fraja and Delbono (1990), in which an SOE 
is assumed to behave strategically to maximise social welfare.  
We begin by showing that, under reasonable assumptions, an industry 
comprising at least two SOEs does not yield a symmetric stable equilibrium. 
Thus, we suggest a novel interpretation of the need for some planning in such 
industries. We then move on to consider mixed oligopoly on the assumption 
that an SOE has a cost disadvantage relative to a private firm. As Estrin and 
de Meza (1995) have shown, it is only in the presence of this cost 
 
1 See, for example, Crémer, Marchand and Thisse (1989), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Estrin 
and de Meza (1995), White (1996), and Matsumura (1998). A survey of early contributions is 
given by De Fraja and Delbono (1990). 
1 disadvantage that private firms are viable. Perhaps surprisingly, we show 
that if the cost disadvantage is not too large (i) the presence of a high-cost firm 
(an SOE) is immaterial for social welfare and (ii) replacing a public monopoly 
with a free-entry all-private oligopoly does not raise welfare. Note that the 
first of these results implies that there may be no welfare gain from 
privatisation. However, if fixed costs are incurred after entry, there can be no 
mixed-oligopoly equilibrium. An SOE with a cost disadvantage cannot 
survive in a contestable market. 
The equilibrium for an industry composed entirely of SOEs is 
examined in Section 2. Mixed oligopoly, with entry, is considered in Section 3. 
Section 4 gives concluding comments. An appendix contains all proofs. 
 
2. State-Owned Enterprise Equilibrium 
We begin by considering a homogenous-good oligopoly populated by 
two SOEs, each entertaining Cournot conjectures. Each firm is assumed to 
maximise an increasing function of its own output, subject to a break-even 
constraint. This simple model allows us to highlight a previously unnoticed, 
but important, feature of markets populated by SOEs. 
 
Proposition 1 Whenever firms choose output levels simultaneously to maximise an 
objective function increasing in their own output, subject to a zero-profit constraint, 
the resulting symmetric equilibrium is unstable. 
 
2 This proposition is illustrated in Figure 1 for the ‘linear Cournot oligopoly,’ 
where both market demand and total cost for two identical firms are linear. 
For reference, the best-response curves that would obtain if firms 1 and 2 
were profit-maximizers are labelled   and  , respectively.   112 (,) c Rqq 212 (,) c Rqq
[Figure 1 about here] 
The Nash equilibrium for profit-maximizers is at E’’.  The two curves marked 
(,) 112 qq 0 π =  and  (,) 212 qq 0 π =  are the best-response functions for SOE 1 and 
2, respectively, and, as the former cuts the latter from above, the resulting 
equilibrium at point E is unstable.2 
The inherent instability of an industry made up of two (or more) SOEs 
suggests a novel explanation for the incompatibility between state ownership 
of firms and decentralised decision-making, for Proposition 1 implies that 
more than one SOE can operate in a market system only if there is quantity 
guidance. One way of achieving this is through explicit command by the state. 
Alternatively, this instability problem may be resolved if there are exogenous 
constraints on output, as was common in the early years of the transition 
economies (see Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). This is also illustrated in Figure 
1. Suppose that the capacity constraint for each firm is  i q i q ≤ , as shown. Then 
the  best-response  curve  of  each  SOE  becomes   i qq i = ,  and  the  symmetric  
 
2 Strictly speaking, the best response of each SOE is given by the entire non-increasing 
segment of its zero-profit curve, so that the best-response curve for SOE 1 (resp., 2) is given 
by ABCEH (AEFGH). Notice also the two stable asymmetric equilibria at A and H. 
3 equilibrium E’ is stable. 3   
 
3. Mixed Oligopoly and Entry 
In view of Proposition 1, in what follows we shall consider a mixed 
oligopoly with a single SOE. We assume that the number n of private firms, 
each of which is a profit maximiser, is determined by free entry. Also, for 
most of our analysis, we assume that all firms sink their fixed costs prior to 
entry, that is, before output decisions are made.4 For simplicity, we consider 
the linear Cournot case: 
(1)  ii i P i qq a qq (, ) − − = −−  
(2)  ii Cq c q k () i = +  
() P ⋅  is the inverse demand curve facing firm i;  () C ⋅  is its total cost;  is its 
fixed cost ;   is the sum of outputs of firms other than i; a and c  are positive 
constants. In a mixed oligopoly we name the SOE as firm 1 and burden it with 
a cost disadvantage compared to private firms. In the absence of this cost 




3 For this result to obtain it is necessary that the capacity constraint e.g. for firm 1 is no greater 
than 1’s output at the unstable equilibrium and no less than the quantity at which the curve 
112 (, )0 qq π =  cuts the horizontal axis. Similar comments apply with respect to firm 2. 
4 The relevance of this assumption, which is also made by Estrin and de Meza (1995), will be 
apparent later (see Proposition 3). In accordance with the literature on mixed oligopoly, we 
ignore the integer constraint problem while acknowledging that in very special cases it may 
turn inequalities regarding the number of firms under various regimes from strict to weak. 
4 levels in equilibrium (Estrin and de Meza, 1995, Proposition 1).5 We 
distinguish two types of cost differential: 
Type 1: cc >= == ∀ > 1j 1j 0 kkk j 1 ,;  
Type 2:  1j 1j cc0 kk j 1 , == > ∀ > . 
We surmise that our results hold for any combinations of type-1 and type-2 
cost differentials. 
In spite of these cost differences and of the different objective functions 
being maximised by the SOE and private firms, we can show the following. 
 
Proposition 2. Assume fixed costs are sunk before entry and entry is free. Then, if a 
mixed oligopoly is viable, it yields the same welfare level as an all-private oligopoly. 
 
In the Appendix we prove Proposition 2 in two stages. First, we show 
that the same aggregate level of output is produced under an all-private 
oligopoly and a mixed oligopoly (so that consumers are indifferent). Then, we 
show that aggregate costs are also identical under the two regimes (thereby 
nullifying the effect of the cost differentials between the SOE and private 
firms).  
 
5 In this context, it is interesting to consider the practice, widespread in the communist era 
(Rein, Friedman and Wörgötter, 1997) of SOEs providing social benefits to their workers, 
thereby imposing an additional cost compared to new (private) entrants. The transfer of such 
benefit provision to government agencies takes place before entrants have been able to 
establish themselves, may make it impossible for the entrants to survive. Retention of benefit 
provision by SOEs may be used as a second-best competition policy. 
5 Two contradictory forces are behind the ‘irrelevance’ result that obtains 
when the mixed oligopoly is viable. On the one hand, the SOE’s higher costs 
give it  a competitive disadvantage relative to private firms. On the other, the 
SOE’s objective of maximising an increasing function of output, subject to a 
break-even constraint is a competitive advantage. In effect, it is a credible 
commitment to compete aggressively, past its profit-maximising output level. 
In equilibrium, these two factors balance out in the sense that social welfare is 
the same in the presence of the SOE as it is without it (there is no case for 
privatisation). Aggregate output is determined by profits being driven down 
to zero, and it is not relevant whether the process that drives profits to zero is 
free entry or a binding zero-profit constraint. The powerful effects of free 
entry render the difference in objective functions between the firms 
insignificant.6 However, if the difference in costs between the SOE and private 
firms is so great that, given free private entry, the SOE cannot break even, the 
irrelevance result breaks down.7 
However, Proposition 2 does not imply that, with free entry, a public 
monopoly can be replaced painlessly by an all-private oligopoly, as the 
following remark makes clear. 
 
 
6 Our irrelevance result is reminiscent of, but different from, the irrelevance result established 
by White (1996), extended by Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and generalised by Myles (2002). In 
their analysis, if output subsidies are set optimally, output, profits, and social welfare are the 
same irrespective of whether the industry is made up of any of the following. (i) One welfare-
maximising public firm and n profit-maximising private firms, all setting outputs 
simultaneously; (ii) one welfare-maximising public firm acting as a Stackelberg leader, with n 
profit-maximising private firms as followers; or (iii) n+1 firms maximising profits. 
7 Inequality (A11) in the Appendix characterises implicitly whether the SOE can break even. 
6 Remark. Assume that fixed costs are sunk before entry. As under free entry aggregate 
output is a sufficient statistic for social welfare, for a free-entry private oligopoly to be 
welfare-superior to a public monopoly, aggregate fixed costs under the former must be 
smaller than the public firm’s fixed cost. 
 
The rationale for the Remark is easy to see: both under public monopoly 
and all-private oligopoly profits are zero (by design in the former, by free 
entry in the latter), so for social welfare to be higher under private oligopoly 
aggregate output must be higher than under public monopoly. This can only 
be achieved if the substantial entry required to push output upwards does not 
lead to higher aggregate fixed costs than under public monopoly. Or, to put it 
differently, if n private oligopolists do replace a public monopoly, their fixed 
costs must be at least 1/nth of the SOE’s. 
Moreover, Proposition 2 is not robust to removal of the assumption 
that the sunk costs are incurred before entry, as the following proposition 
shows.  
 
Proposition 3. If fixed costs are incurred after entry, there can be no mixed-oligopoly 
equilibrium. 
 
The rationale for Proposition 3 is that the SOE, in spite of the strategic 
advantage of having an objective function that pushes its output beyond the 
profit-maximising level, is unable to compete with private firms, as long as 
the latter are endowed with any type of cost advantage. The significance of 
7 the change in assumption between Proposition 2, with its associated Remark, 
and Proposition 3, relates entirely to the way that the presence or absence of 
sunk costs affects the behaviour of private firms. Since an SOE breaks even, its 
strategy is the same, to cover its total costs, regardless of whether they include 
a sunk element. 
 
4.  Concluding Comments 
The paper has highlighted some interesting and hitherto unnoticed 
features of the behaviour of SOEs, whether competing with each other or with 
profit-maximising firms. It has demonstrated that public oligopolies 
(industries comprising more than one SOE) are unstable thereby suggesting 
the need for some externally-imposed quantity constraints. For mixed 
oligopolies, it has shown the crucial role played by sunk costs and the scale of 
the cost differential between SOEs and private firms in determining whether 
the replacement of a public monopoly with private oligopoly is welfare 
enhancing. It has also provided an irrelevance result suggesting that even 
when SOEs operate at a cost disadvantage relative to private firms, there may 
be no gain from privatisation.  Given the active role of SOEs, the on-going 
privatisation programmes, and the need for appropriate competition policy in 
transition economies (Roland, 2000), the application of this analysis to such 
economies will be an interesting path for further research. 
8 Equation Section (Next)Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
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,  i ≠ j=1,2. 
To sign (A4) unambiguously we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1  
(i) the inverse demand function is symmetric, i.e.,  i j ii jj Pq q q Pq q q (,) (,) ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂; 
(ii) the cost function has the form C .  i i i i k q c q + = ) (
Assumption 1 guarantees that 
(A5)  ii
ij qq ππ ∂∂ < ∂∂  
i.e., the absolute value of the impact of a change in its own output level on profits is 
smaller than impact of a change in its rival’s output level on its own profits. 8 It 





















is never satisfied.                         Q.E.D. 
Given inverse market demand (1) and cost function (2) assumption 1 is satisfied and 
so Proposition 1 holds. In fact (A3) becomes  0 k q c q q a i i i j i = − − − − ) ( . Totally 
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. This case is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
8 To derive (A5), note that, from (A2),  (, )
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 Therefore, as a necessary condition for gross profits to be 
positive is that  , it follows that:  
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9 Proof of Proposition 2. 
We prove the irrelevance of ownership structure under free entry by means 
of a simple Lemma and its Corollary. First we define some terms. Let Q, q1, qj, and n 
be respectively aggregate output, SOE’s own output, output produced by private 
firm j (j>1), and the total number of firms in the industry. We denote by superscripts 
* and O respectively the equilibrium values under mixed and all-private oligopoly. 
Lemma. Under free entry a mixed oligopoly with a zero-profit-constrained firm will produce 
the same amount of output as an all-private oligopoly: 
(A6)  oo o
j j 1 Q q n1 q n q Q ** ( * ) * ≡+ − = ≡ . 
Proof. These equilibrium values are the solutions to the following two programs.  
First, for mixed oligopoly: 
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(A10)  *( * ) / * ;* . [ *( * ) * 2
11 j 11 qa q n q 0 5 a c na c n 4 n k =− = − + − − ] 1 . 
Notice that, as we are imposing the constraint that the SOE be viable, in order for the 
SOE’s output to be a real number, the following must hold 
(A11)  .  ac n nk 2
11 (* ) 4 * −≥
Secondly, in an all-private oligopoly, each of nO firms maximises its own 
profit by setting its output at 
(A12)   oo








 net profits. 
Ignoring integer constraints, the free-entry number of firms in an all-private 
oligopoly, nO, is therefore given by 








Under both mixed oligopoly and pure private oligopoly, private firms enter so long 
as they make positive profits. Thus, from (A12) and (A13), entry ceases at the point at 
which [/ . Hence,  o2
















The free-entry number of firms in a mixed oligopoly, nO, is found as follows. 
As private gross profits per firm are increasing in the number of entrants, the 
10 maximum number of private firms compatible with the SOE remaining viable is 
given by the condition (* . From  (A10), this implies that  ac n nk 2
1 ) 4 * −= 1





















(A13), this implies that 











(A6) can therefore be written as 
(A17) 
** **
*( * ) ( * )
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         Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary. Under free entry and a zero-profit-constrained public firm, the aggregate level of 
costs is the same under a mixed oligopoly and an all-private oligopoly.  
Proof.  If the cost difference between public and private firms is of type 1 (i.e.   














9, we obtain cq , whereas if the cost 
differential is of type 2 (cc
o n k nk 1 1 ** +=
j 1 0 kk j 1 ∀ > , > == ), then, substituting (A14) and (A16) 
into the public firm’s zero-profit constraint we obtain  o
j j k n k 1 ) +−= kn .      Q.E.D.  1 (*
Thus, from the Lemma, output is the same under the two ownership structures, 
while from its Corollary, aggregate costs are the same in the two cases. Proposition 2 
follows immediately: welfare is the same in each case.  
 
Proof of Remark. 
For cost differentials of type 2, net welfare is  22
1 Wn 1 0 5a a a 4 k () . [( ) == −− −
o 2
j 1 k () )] + −
2 ]  
under public monopoly and 
 under free-entry private 
oligopoly, where, because of free entry, the last term in square brackets is zero. Note 
that 
o2 o 2 o Wn 0 5 a 1 1 n 1 n a n ( ) . [ ( / () ] [ ( / =−+ +
oo o Wn Wn 1 na n 1 0 5a () ( ) / ( ) . [ >= ⇔ + > 2
1 a 4 k] + − . Using the free entry 
condition this simplifies to 
 
9 Using the SOE’s zero-profit constraint and  j1 q a q n ** () / =− * , we obtain 
aq
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
. Substituting from (A14) and simplifying, the required value of 
c1  is obtained. 







  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
 
As Estrin and de Meza (1995) note (see their Proposition 4), in a mixed oligopoly, the 
profit of a private firm is increasing in the number of firms.10 The largest number of 
firms compatible with the SOE being active, n, is given by ()  for type-1 
cost differential and by   for type 2. Therefore, the largest fixed costs that a 
private firm can sustain without incurring a loss are given, respectively, by 
% % ac n n k 2
1 4 −= %



























.11 However, an industry made 
up of a single SOE and n  private firms cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium 
because entry by an additional private firm would (a) shut down the SOE and (b) 
yield a positive profit to the additional entrant, as now each of the   private firms 
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> , where n  is defined by  2
1 ac n 4 n k −= ()  . Differentiation yields: 





=− − , i.e., profit is increasing in entry if the decrease in public firm’s 






signa a c n a a c n 4 n k 2 n k a c n a c n
dn
() () () () / 2 0
π
=
=− − − − − = − + > .  
11  With respect to type-2 cost differentials, set  1 c0 =  in (A10). The largest n compatible with 
the square root to be real is defined by  , in which case  2
1 a4 n k = % 1 qa /2 = . Therefore a 
private firm’s output is  j1 q a q na / = 2 n / ( %
j
() =− )  and gross profit per private firm is 
, which must equal private fixed cost k .  2 a2 n (/ ( ) ) %
12 To see that this condition holds, notice that in this case  1 ca n 1n 1 n (( ) ) / (( ) ) =− + %% % .  
Hence, the condition is equivalent to  4n32 n 2n 1 0 − −− > %% % , which holds  n1 ∀ > % . 
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Fig. 1  SOE Oligopoly 
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